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For the full text of this licence, please go to: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ Beyond the comfort zone: internal crisis and external challenge in the European Union's response to rising powers MICHAEL SMITH How successful has the European Union been in recognizing and responding diplomatically to the challenge posed by rising powers, and what does this tell us about the status and role of the Union in international negotiation more generally?
The argument in this article starts from three observations about the role of EU diplomacy in pursuing the Union's external interests. First, at least on paper, the EU has progressively equipped itself with the apparatus of a developed and comprehensive diplomacy, most obviously through the framing and then the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. Second, that diplomacy has over the long term been directed predominantly towards the promotion and maintenance of negotiated order as a key approach to global governance and to the pursuit of the Union's interests. Third, this approach-the pursuit of global negotiated order through a wideranging EU diplomacy-is currently under major challenge from a confluence of internal and external forces, and thus the position of the EU in the overall framework of global governance and world order is open to question in ways that are effectively unprecedented. To put it bluntly, the Union is currently well outside its comfort zone and is likely to remain there for the foreseeable future.
These initial observations lead to a number of questions, which will guide the subsequent argument. First, how has the search for global negotiated order played into conceptions of the EU's diplomatic status and role? Second, how has the challenge to these conceptions arisen, and how can it be described, especially with reference to the The argument in general is that the accumulation of diplomatic instruments by the EU has led over the past two decades to a set of assumptions about status and role that have guided the EU's quest for negotiated order in the world arena-and, incidentally, that this quest is a key feature of the EU's self-conception as expressed by Brussels policy-makers. These assumptions are now challenged internally not only by the effects of the financial crisis but also by a broader crisis of legitimacy and a narrower crisis of institutional capacity. At the same time, they are challenged externally by the rise of new powers, by pressures on the global institutions and principles of action that have in the past benefited the Union, and specifically by the rise of the BRIC countries. The challenge has been met with an uncertain response, discernible in a number of key areas of policy, and this in turn raises a number of important questions about the future of the EU's world order diplomacy.
This argument links strongly to the key themes set out in the guiding paper in this special issue by Amrita Narlikar.
1 On the one side, it is clear that the EU can be conceptualized as an established power, which both supports and benefits from the established order in terms of global institutions and principles of international life.
This in turn is a key factor in conditioning the EU's approach to global negotiated order, but for the EU there is an added dimension: the Union itself is a form of international negotiated order, and externally a form of emerging 'power', and this is vital to an understanding of its response to external challenges. 2 In terms of its international practice, the EU sets great store by the refinement of international norms and institutional forms, and especially on the conduct of negotiations in institutionalized settings. As a consequence, the Union is heavily engaged in the promotion of negotiation strategies as a form of self-identification, in the attempt to frame international negotiation processes as a reflection of its own internal logics, and in the search for coalitions as a validation of its status in the world arena. This in turn has encouraged a view of the Union within the EU institutions as a potential leader in global negotiating processes, and as the progenitor of a certain style of diplomacy and negotiation, building on its internal deliberative and coalition-building processes. In this context, the rise of challenges both internally and externally is in some ways a bigger challenge for the EU than it is for other established powers, and some might go so far as to term the combination an existential challenge, penetrating to the heart of perceptions of the EU as an international actor. Whereas for other established powers the question is one of adjustment-sometimes wrenching-to new challenges, for the EU it is one of a different order.
1 'Negotiating the rise of new powers': see pp. 000-00 above. and relating these to a number of key EU concerns: security, commercial policy, development, environment and energy. The final section of the article returns to the general issues raised in this introduction, and to possible futures for EU diplomacy in the context of the changing world order. It should be noted at this point that the focus of the argument is strongly on the EU, but that at a number of junctures the question of 'Europe' more broadly, and of the negotiating orientations of EU member states in particular, will be addressed; indeed, this is part of the argument-and a source of questions-about the EU's status and role in the generation of international negotiated order.
Diplomacy, status and role in EU external relations
There is a very large and growing literature on the nature of the EU as an international actor, and this has become one of the litmus tests of the development of the European project. The purpose here is not to dwell on these often rather abstract approaches, but to draw attention to four key aspects of the EU's approach to diplomatic processes and practices in the world arena, and to lay the basis for an understanding of the challenges to which these are now subject.
The first aspect relates to the nature of EU diplomacy itself. This is a long-established and multidimensional aspect of the European project. In fact, there are several strands to the development of the EU's system of diplomacy, and it is important to recognize these here since their existence contributes to the current predicament that faces the Union. In the first place, there is a well-established strand of commercial diplomacy, resting on the common commercial policy as progressively extended and consolidated Diplomacy, embodies in many ways a 'sovereignist' approach to international action, in contrast to the 'post-sovereign' or 'post-Westphalian' approach associated with the EU.
The real problem, though, is that the EU corresponds to all and none of the above (and other) labels. A key fact of its international life is that its status is still uncertain. One obvious related fact is that while the EU is what some might describe as a 'commercial superpower', in other areas of its external action it is decidedly stunted.
For the EU, this creates a problem of coherence and consistency, which is underlined by the interinstitutional problems that persist even after (or because of?) Lisbon. This is of course a variant of what Christopher Hill described as the 'capabilitiesexpectations gap'-a problem not suffered uniquely by the EU, but certainly suffered in a distinctive way. 16 In reality, there is not one such gap, but a series of gaps, broader or narrower, depending upon the areas of activity that are under examination.
In the context of the argument here, a key element of this situation is that the EU operates over a wide range of diplomatic 'sites', each with its own specific features and its own challenges to the EU's aspirations and resources. been said already that the EU faces issues in all three of these areas. Role conceptions are framed not only in Brussels but also in national capitals, and then shaped by external forces; role performance is subject to institutional and capacity limitations, and will vary widely from issue area to issue area reflecting the status uncertainties and resource issues noted above; role evaluation will reflect not only an objective measure of performance but also the political and normative debate about the ways in which the Union itself ought or ought not to develop.
The result is that the EU embodies a set of paradoxes. It is often presented as a externalization of the commitment to internal negotiated order within the Union: this is the key way in which member states and others are engaged with the European project, through a process of intense transgovernmentalism, and it makes perfect sense for it to be the organizing principle of EU external action. To use the definitions put forward by Amrita Narlikar in her framing essay, the presumption would be that the EU, externally as well as internally, would be committed to negotiating strategies based on deliberation and the active pursuit of coalitions, and to integrative and valuecreating negotiations, since those are what has served the project well through its half century and more of existence. In the world arena, this creates a natural preference for the creation of rules and regimes, expressed through processes of continual negotiation and aimed at the creation or enhancement of global public goodswhether these are defined in terms of security, welfare or the promotion of global values. 18 Further, this preference clearly serves the need of the EU and its institutions for recognition as a major international actor: engagement in global negotiations is a significant contributor to the credibility of the Union as a diplomatic presence. As noted above, this position can be distinguished quite sharply from that of the United
States, but clearly it is also important to note that both the EU and the US can be seen as 'established powers' in the sense used by Narlikar, given that both are major stakeholders in the existing order and institutional configuration.
This commitment to negotiated order in the world arena remains at the core of EU external action. But, as can be seen from the argument in this section, it is currently under severe challenge. first of all to be clear about the nature of the external challenge itself, and this is the subject of the next section.
The challenge of rising powers
The shaking of the EU's internal foundations has been accompanied by a rising sense of external challenge from new actors and new issues, especially in connection with the emergence of new groups of 'powers' in the world arena. 20 The two are of course not unconnected, and we will return to that relationship later. But here the purpose is to identify as clearly as possible the ways in which the challenge of rising powers makes itself felt for the EU, as a preliminary to exploring the EU's responses. This section will look first at the nature of the changing world arena and the opportunities or constraints it offers for the EU, then at the specific challenge of the BRIC countries, and then at the ways in which this challenges the EU's system of diplomacy. It will conclude by asking what might be expected in the way of an EU response to this set of challenges. its power in specific conflict situations, the third by the emergence of rising powers and their much more active (re-)engagement in world affairs. Viewed in these terms, the world arena has provided major opportunities for the EU to develop a diplomatic presence and to maximize its diplomatic impact, but also major constraints on its ability to do so. elsewhere. Not least, of course, it has been damaged by the revelations of its own vulnerability in the light of the eurozone sovereign debt crisis.
The shorthand conclusion of this discussion is that in terms of the changing global arena broadly defined, the EU has experienced an opening up of opportunities through the 1990s, but then a progressive closing down during the first decade and more of the new century, as a result of the internal and external constraints noted above. We shall return to this set of issues later when discussing the EU's response, but the picture in general terms now needs to be supplemented by an exploration of the specific challenges posed by emerging powers, and especially the BRIC countries. The EU has faced challenges from emerging powers before-perhaps most obviously from Japan and then Korea and the 'Asian tigers' in the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s-and in those cases responded through a mixture of internal reform through the Single Market Programme, external regulation through bilateral agreements and outright protectionism, and multilateral rule application through the GATT. These targets of EU policies, while often the source of suspicion, were also rather obliging: they wanted to take advantage of the multilateral benefits to be gained from the GATT, and they did not want to challenge the principles of the multilateral system itself.
They could also be dealt with in many respects on an arm's length basis, since at that point they posed predominantly an external rather than a transnational challenge. And they did not bear with them any major implications for the management of global security and stability.
The current challenge is by no means so easy to deal with. negotiating 'sites' and specific coalitions. Second, the challenge is of much greater scale than that of the 1970s and 1980s: the countries concerned are (or are in the process of becoming) the world's largest producers of some commodities and products, and are often also the largest consumers of important raw materials-some of which are particularly sensitive for the EU. One concomitant of this is the BRICS' increasing interest in and engagement with areas such as sub-Saharan Africa in which the EU has previously considered itself to have a leading position, both in terms of development and in terms of security. Third, the BRICs especially are taking an increasingly activist position on the nature of global governance and the reform of the multilateral system, and they take markedly divergent positions on many institutional issues from those adopted by the EU (and the United States). In respect of the EU in particular, these positions reflect the underlying issue noted earlier-the European pursuit of a 'post-sovereign' diplomacy and approach to governance in a world where many actors are resolutely 'sovereignist' in their approaches. Whereas previously this challenge could be managed because the major 'sovereignist' actor, the United States, shared strategic commitments and underlying values with the EU in many areas, and others such as Japan were not inclined to be assertive, neither of these conditions applies now. The rising powers are (with variations) 'sovereignist', committed to diverse values and inclined to be assertive. Finally, the challenge is one that links welfare and security in crucial ways: the issues of energy security, environmental security and human security are raised in different ways by different emerging powers, but they are inseparable from the challenge as a whole.
What does this mean for the EU and its efforts at external action, in particular its construction of a system of diplomacy to bring together its external policies? The rise of the new 'great powers' is an external shock for the Union, but it is one of a slowburning kind that will be punctuated by other short-term shocks and perturbations. Its course is so far difficult to predict, and as a result there is a pervasive uncertainty (not just in the EU) about its implications for international structures, and for the status and role of the Union. This is supplemented in many areas by a parallel uncertainty about the position and the role of the United States, which has found it difficult to adjust to changes in its domestic and its external environments. A key question for the EU is whether the new incompletely multipolar system will also be one in which principles of multilateralism hold sway; to the extent that they do, the EU could be said still to be in the same game as it always has been, but to the extent that they don't, the EU will be challenged particularly sharply. To put this in practical terms: in dealing with new challenges in East Asia, the EU has a range of potential multilateral or interregional approaches, but the United States has many more, arising out of its status as a leading 'power' of the traditional kind, and there are resulting difficulties in trying to frame an approach that could engage both the EU and the US in pursuit of common goals. 25 Such EU-US cooperation might be seen as a logical consequence of the increasing difficulties faced by international cooperation in general, but even if possible it may not be enough to reinvigorate cooperation at the global level. The brute fact is that in the presence of the rising powers, such broader cooperation is not possible without their support-or at least, the support of a majority of them-and the quest for such support comes up against precisely the diversity and fluidity of values and interests identified earlier.
One central challenge will be precisely to the EU's emerging system of diplomacy as outlined earlier in the paper. The nature of the challenge from rising powers is one of a scope, scale and variety not experienced by the Union at any point in its existence. It links security and welfare considerations in novel and potentially threatening ways.
And it has major implications not only for the Union as a collective, but also for key EU member states, who experience security and commercial challenges and opportunities at a national level as well as through the mediating influence of Brussels. To coin a phrase, this challenge requires a full-spectrum diplomatic response, with the capacity to link and fruitfully integrate responses in a variety of areas and at a variety of levels. But we have already seen that the diplomatic system of the EU remains fragmented, that there are internal challenges to be overcome, and that the overall structure of the world arena is one in which arguably the 'space' for effective EU diplomacy has been closed down. with a concomitant need for coordination and linkage to give it effect and to evaluate its impact-but there would be internal and external uncertainties about how this response might be articulated and implemented. One such area of uncertainty might be the emergence of significant problems arising from institutional fragmentation, from the activism of member states, and from the patchy nature of leadership and legitimacy within the EU system. This set of problems could well be accompanied by issues arising from lack of capacity and resources within the system, coupled with an inability to respond rapidly and effectively to changing circumstances.
The next section will explore the nature and extent of the EU's response to the BRICs within this context, before the final section provides an overall evaluation of the EU's diplomatic responses.
The EU's response: still searching for negotiated order, but in a changed world
As noted earlier, the search for negotiated order in the world arena has been at the centre of the EU's diplomatic efforts-not just since the Lisbon Treaty, not even since the end of the Cold War, but since the early days of the European project. In this quest, the EU has deployed a number of lines of action-bilateral, interregional, multilateral-and as a result it is possible to talk of an inventory of methods by which the EU has pursued negotiated order. It has also deployed these methods in distinctive ways, not least because the Union has very little weight in certain areas of the diplomatic spectrum. To be specific, the EU's system of diplomacy is hardly at all linked to the possible deployment of hard power, although this does not rule out the use of a number of coercive measures, such as economic sanctions, in pursuit of the broader principles of negotiated order. In this section, the discussion centres on the inventory mentioned above, and on the ways in which it has been used in relation to rising powers. The discussion attempts to make explicit some of the implications of the ways in which the EU has responded to rising powers, and to illustrate this by reference to the key issues mentioned earlier: security, commerce, development, environment, energy.
The first set of measures that the EU has used in its response to rising powers consists of bilateral negotiations and frameworks. Indeed, one of the key elements of the EU's bilateral approaches to rising powers has been the attempt to create frameworks within which such powers might be contained and the dynamics of the relationships managed in a way that is comfortable for the Union. One of the key features in this area has been the EU's pursuit of strategic partnerships: each of the BRIC countries has been engaged by the Union in negotiations designed to create a set of principles for such a partnership, to develop an infrastructure of dialogues and sectoral working relationships, and to enmesh the 'target' ever more fully within a dense set of institutionalized links that would render the costs of defection higher than they otherwise might have been. Such partnerships have also been explicitly linked to the EU's pursuit of 'effective multilateralism' and to the broader desirability of commitments to global governance processes. 26 From an 'internal' EU perspective, these strategic partnerships have been part of the means by which the EU has attempted to establish itself as an interlocutor at the highest levels in the world arena, and thus a means by which the EU's role conception as a major but distinctive type of power can be promoted. From an external perspective, in addition to the points made above, the notion of strategic partnerships has paralleled moves by the United States to refashion its bilateral relationships with key emerging powers, but it has been carried out without the baggage of hard security concerns that have provided a continuing set of frictions for the US in its relationships with all the BRICs.
The record of these EU-initiated strategic partnerships, however, is patchy, and the concept has itself become diluted and open to question. EU to be a strategic partner, but in each case the scope and depth of the partnership achieved have been open to question. Sometimes this has been a reflection of the unevenness of the EU's interaction with the countries concerned: in most cases, the predominant element of the partnership is commercial collaboration, but these are countries with which the EU has also had a good deal of competitive tension, and which have exposed the relative vulnerability of key sectors in the European economy. A key illustration in this case is that of relations with China in such areas as textiles or 'rare earths'. Equally, where there has been a significant security concern as part of the relationship, this has often proved to be intractable-the most obvious example being that of energy relations with the Russians-and none of the partnership negotiations have shown the EU able to incorporate major security concerns.
Increasingly, development policy has become an area of competition between the EU and its potential strategic partners, the most salient case being that of sub-Saharan Africa, as already noted. EU efforts to arrive at understandings with the Chinese and others-and thus to defend what had previously been seen as almost a domaine réservée-have had relatively little concrete payoff. As already noted, energy relations with the BRIC countries have become sensitive in a variety of ways, and have also become linked with environmental concerns-the Chinese opposition to the extension of the EU's emissions trading scheme to passenger aircraft originating outside the EU being a classic example of the kind of linkage that may or may not be intended and certainly poses major problems of diplomatic management.
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The rhetoric and the reality of strategic partnership are thus often widely distanced from one another. The lesson appears to be that when efforts are made to go beyond the rhetoric and the comforting general sentiments to negotiate material obligations and commitments-whether these are in the security or the welfare sphere-things become much more difficult. It is also clear that from the EU perspective there is a tension over ownership of strategic partnerships: while it seems clear that the would demonstrate the utility of soft balancing mechanisms, through which the EU could enter into the power dynamics of specific regions and frame regional agendas without having an established or material presence beyond its undoubted commercial concerns. But, as pointed out earlier, that is precisely the kind of well-ordered world in which we do not live now and in which we will not be living for the foreseeable future. As a result, it is markedly less likely that the EU will be able to penetrate a number of regional arenas, not least because of their increasing focus on the regional power preoccupations of precisely those rising powers that the EU might wish to 'contain'. Not only this, but the appeal of the EU as an extraregional partner has been tarnished by its internal economic and financial travails, and by the questioning of the European 'model' even within Europe itself.
The broader multilateral system is key to the background against which the EU's bilateral and interregional diplomacy operates, and thus also to the potential for the furthering of negotiated order in the world arena. As noted earlier, one image of the EU is as a compulsive multilateralist, reflecting the benefits it has undoubtedly harvested from the existing mechanisms of global governance. These benefits are partly material, for example in terms of commercial advantage and the construction of beneficial international regimes; they are also to be found in terms of legitimacy and status, intangible but powerful contributions to the image of the EU as a global actor and to the propagation of European values. The Union has tied its diplomacy tightly to central elements in the multilateral system for these reasons-predominantly in the economic and social spheres, but increasingly in the security domain, and particularly in the latter case to the United Nations system. Hence the intense efforts by the EEAS to ensure 'enhanced observer' status in the UN General Assembly, and the explicit linking of EU efforts in such areas as non-proliferation to UN mandates and frameworks.
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How effective has the EU been as a multilateralist, in using the global multilateral system as a means not only of enhancing its own status but also of bringing rising A number of key problems can be identified in the EU's response to the challenge of the rising powers, and especially in its attempts to achieve an enhancement of global negotiated order through diplomacy. Briefly, they may be summarized as follows. approach-integrative, value-creating-to the handling of relations with BRIC countries, largely as a reflection of the above factors. This is not a comfortable position for the continued conduct of EU diplomacy towards rising powers, and it directly contributes to continuing uncertainty about the EU's capacity to take responsibility, exercise leadership and build a stable role through its diplomacy towards rising powers in particular and global governance more generally.
Conclusion
At the beginning of this article, three observations were made about the nature of EU diplomacy in the current period. First, the EU had spent a lot of time and effort equipping itself with the tools with which to frame and conduct a coordinated approach to external action and diplomacy. Second, a predominant end of the external projection of EU diplomacy has been the promotion of negotiated order as an approach to the management of the world arena. Third, the EU's approach and actions are now under question and challenge as never before, thanks to a concatenation of internal and external forces that has thrown into question the EU's capacity to adapt to and profit from a reshaped world arena. As a corollary to these observations, it was also noted that there was a continuing tension in some areas between the EU and 'Europe', specifically reflecting the uneasy fit between EU institutions and aspirations and those of the EU's member states.
The argument in the article has proceeded on the basis of those initial observations and the questions to which they give rise. It has pointed out the continuing uncertainties about the foundations and status of the EU's system of diplomacy, the complexity and diversity of the challenge posed by the rising powers in a turbulent global arena, and the unevenness of the EU's diplomatic response in a context where an effective 'full spectrum diplomacy' is called for. Rather than rehearsing the conclusions to individual parts of the article in detail here, I want to conclude by making three further observations. First, the argument advanced in the past, that success in the diplomatic field and the use of diplomatic status acts as an 'antidote'
for the travails of the EU's internal processes, is no longer available, since the EU's diplomacy faces intractable problems of its own and is radically constrained by internal crisis. Second, the scope and scale of the external challenge from rising powers is such as to strain to the limit the capacity of the EU's diplomacy, and at the same time the credibility of the EU as an international actor is undermined both materially and ideationally by the continuing internal crisis of the European project.
Finally, the EU in this context does not have the power to frame international negotiations or to ensure integrative, value-adding outcomes for negotiations, even in areas where it is well established. Whereas there was a time in the late 1990s where the EU could claim to have this power, that time has gone, and we are now in a much less hospitable environment for the EU. In short, to reiterate a claim made at the beginning of the article, the EU is now a long way outside its comfort zone, and it is difficult in current circumstances to see how it can retrieve the situation. Making the attempt is important; but the chances of doing so in the short or medium term are small.
